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Organized Crime and Places 
Edward R. Kleemans 
 
1. Introduction 
Environmental criminology has produced major theoretical and empirical progress regarding the 
explanation and prevention of specific types of crime, particularly opportunistic street-level 
crime. The primary focus on these types of crime can be explained by the fact that the emergence 
of environmental criminology in the 1970s and 1980s coincided with pressing urban crime 
problems, including car crime, robbery, and burglary, in many Western, industrialized countries. 
Only later on, ideas from environmental criminology and situational crime prevention theory 
were transplanted to other, more serious types of “organized crimes,” often requiring a higher 
degree of social organization (e.g., Cornish and Clarke 2002; Van de Bunt and Van der Schoot 
2003; Levi and Maguire 2004; Van der Schoot 2006; Bouloukos, Farrell, and Laycock 2003; 
Bullock, Clarke, and Tilley 2010; Von Lampe 2011; Kleemans, Soudijn, and Weenink 2012; 
Kleemans and Soudijn 2017). 
Organized crime, however, is a highly contested concept (see Paoli and Vander Beken 
2014). In an overview of theoretical perspectives on organized crime, Kleemans (2014) made a 
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distinction between three types of organized crime and three lines of research: racketeering, 
transit crime, and the local provision of illegal goods and services. The following sections (37.2, 
37.3, and 37.4) go briefly into these three types of organized crime and the significance of place. 
Furthermore, the role of places and the (built) environment for organized crime is discussed 
(Section 37.5). The main message is that place has a different meaning for these three types of 
organized crime and raises several theoretical challenges. As these types of organized crime 
often require a higher degree of social organization than opportunistic street-level crime, Section 
37.6 elaborates on two theoretical concepts that should be included in the study of organized 
crime and place: social opportunity structure and offender convergence settings. Without 
including these concepts, researchers run the risk of missing the main driving mechanisms 
behind the emergence and activities of criminal networks at specific places. Furthermore, the full 
potential of environmental criminology can only be realized if “place” is conceptualized in a 
different way and on a higher level than a specific point in space where an offender meets a 
target. 
2. Racketeering 
Absence of the state and/or state legitimacy is an important condition for certain forms of 
organized crime. Before the emergence of the major transnational drug markets that are so 
salient for organized crime groups today, organized crime groups already made profits in peasant 
societies such as Sicily in the late nineteenth century, by controlling the territory and acting as an 
“alternative government.” Other historical examples include the Hong Kong triads, the Russian 
mafia, and the Japanese yakuza (for a review, see Varese 2011; Kleemans 2015). Forms of 
“racketeering,” illicit activities on legal markets, can also be distinguished by focusing on 
Italian-American Mafia families in New York, exploiting dominant positions in the building 
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sector, the waste disposal industry, the Fulton fish market, the labor unions, the harbor, et cetera 
(e.g., Jacobs 1999). The basic idea is that organized crime groups gain control over certain 
regions or economic sectors and act as “alternative government.” Traditionally, the state is 
supposed to protect citizens, businesses, property rights, and business transactions through 
enforcement and is able to collect taxes for this common goal. If strong and legitimate state 
control is absent, organized crime groups are able to make profits by taking over these two 
traditional state monopolies (the monopoly of violence and taxation). Basically, control is 
exercised through (threats of) violence, and local productive activities are “taxed” by asking for 
protection money, putting people on the paying list, asking higher prices, or forcing buyers to 
accept and pay for certain goods and services. These profits, from “organizing” competition and 
cartel formation to outright extortion, are made possible through a power structure related to 
people, businesses, and politics (see, for a review, Varese 2014). 
If we focus on the concept of place, for these types of criminal activities (racketeering), 
place actually means “territory,” including the control over people, activities, and resources. This 
control is based on social relations and economic and political power relationships. Therefore, 
theoretical explanations for the emergence and endurance of organized crime groups engaged in 
these activities often relate to state formation and borrow from theories from political science 
(e.g., public choice) and economics (monopoly, cartel formation) (for a review, see, e.g., Von 
Lampe 2006). In modern Western societies, we are used to the idea that the control over 
territories is in the hands of “strong states,” but these historical examples show that in many 
other countries and other periods of history, organized crime phenomena are often accompanied 
by the absence of a strong and/or legitimate state, “failed states,” or evaporating state control, 
such as in the case of the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Protection theory is often used to explain the emergence and endurance of criminal 
organizations, such as Mafia control in Sicily (Varese 2014). A specific interpretation by 
Gambetta (1993) is that organized crime groups actually render a “service” by selling private 
protection that the state cannot guarantee. Gambetta argues that Mafia groups respond to a 
demand for private protection: the Mafia actually is a specific economic enterprise that produces, 
promotes, and sells private protection and protects property rights and economic transactions, 
both legal and illegal. Paoli (2003) does not agree with this interpretation and views Mafia 
groups as multifunctional organizations, founded on premodern status and fraternization 
contracts. Mafia groups, in her opinion, have been used for a variety of goals and to accomplish a 
variety of functions. Both authors agree, however, on the “political” dimension of these 
organized crime groups: the power structure of these groups facilitates a variety of illicit 
activities on legal markets. Furthermore, they draw attention to the tacit or explicit support of the 
population and important economic and political actors. Whereas Gambetta favors a more 
“benevolent” interpretation (Mafia groups providing a service), Paoli traces Mafia power 
positions back to culture, history, and politics, and clearly interprets Mafia control as a “social 
bad” (yet hard to get rid of, as it also serves powerful interests). 
In my view, one of the strong aspects of protection theory is that it interprets place on a 
higher level: as control over a territory, normally in the hands of a strong, legitimate state. This 
means that in the absence of a strong, legitimate state, organized crime groups can take over the 
control of territories and sectors and neutralize formal and informal social control. Or even 
worse: refocus informal social control and guardianship from preventing to promoting illicit 
activities. Organized crime research shows that Mafia control can relate to regions and business 
sectors or to smaller villages or neighborhoods, but varies and is not evenly spread (for 
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examples, see, e.g., Varese 2014; Bruinsma 2015). In all cases, however, formal and informal 
social control serves the power structure promoting illicit activities instead of preventing them. 
An interesting recent example relates to worldwide opium production. Unlike producing 
coca leaves (which requires quite specific conditions), opium can be produced in many areas all 
over the world. Nevertheless, opium production is geographically highly concentrated in only a 
few countries, characterized to a large extent by weak states and “lax law enforcement” (Paoli, 
Greenfield, and Reuter 2009). Being left alone by the government and by law enforcement, 
therefore, is an important prerequisite for the emergence and endurance of organized crime 
groups and related activities. In some cases, organized crime groups take over state control and 
serve as an “alternative government,” but also in other cases a focus on power structures (and 
“governance”) in territories and economic sectors might help explain the opportunities for 
organized crime groups and the limitations of formal and informal control and guardianship. 
Compared to the discussion about opportunistic street-level crime, the dominant focus of 
contemporary environmental criminology, three things are different. First, place is interpreted as 
“territory” and goes beyond a specific point in space where an offender meets a target. Second, 
control by Mafia groups and the absence of government control and law enforcement are the 
main issues. Third, the idea of guardianship and informal and formal control is reversed: the 
power structure facilitates illicit activities instead of preventing them. 
3. Transit Crime 
Mafia control is an interesting theoretical topic, and there are clear empirical examples of Mafia 
control in particular countries in particular periods in history (see for a review, e.g., Varese 
2014). However, the empirical reality in many modern Western industrialized countries is that 
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organized crime as Mafia control is the exception rather than the rule.
1
 In terms of economic 
profits, “transit crime” gives a much better description of the activities of organized crime groups 
in many Western European countries: criminal groups are primarily involved in illegal 
international trade, using the same opportunity structure that facilitates legal activities (Kleemans 
2007, p. 176). In a review of organized crime in the Netherlands, a prime example of a transit 
economy, Kleemans (2007) argues that the major business of organized crime groups boils down 
to international smuggling activities: drug trafficking, smuggling illegal immigrants, human 
trafficking for sexual exploitation, arms trafficking, trafficking in stolen vehicles, and other 
transnational illegal activities, such as money laundering and evasion of taxes (e.g., cigarette 
smuggling, value-added tax fraud, and European Community fraud). 
The concept of “transit crime,” as opposed to racketeering and Mafia control, is very 
relevant to the study of organized crime and environmental criminology. It refocuses attention 
from “place” to “borders”: links between places as well as between people living in different 
countries. It is not the coca farmer in Colombia who earns most of the illicit profits, but the 
highest profits are made by the people who are able to import cocaine into the major consumer 
markets in the United States and Western Europe (Reuter 2014). An important finding of 
organized crime research relates to brokerage. Because transnational trafficking activities often 
involve high potential financial gains as well as high risks (due to seizures, arrests, and rip-offs), 
social ties play a crucial role in the functioning of criminal networks (Kleemans and Van de Bunt 
1999). However, social ties are clustered and related to social and geographical proximity. This 
means that social networks contain “structural holes” (Burt 2005), particularly between different 
countries, different ethnic groups, and the underworld and the licit world. As few people can 
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bridge these structural holes and transnational criminal activities require a high level of trust, 
offenders who can bridge these structural holes have all kinds of strategic opportunities to make 
a profit: They are the ones who make the connections between networks that would otherwise 
have remained apart. Because trust is so important, these connections are often based on family 
ties or other strong social bonds (Kleemans 2007, pp. 179–180). 
Due to the importance of trust and the relatively high level of social organization that is 
required for transnational criminal activities, the study of organized crime cannot neglect the 
structure of social ties facilitating these activities. A good example is the prime position of the 
Netherlands as a transit country for drugs in Europe. On the one hand, this can be explained by 
the transit character of the Dutch economy and its excellent facilities, including harbors in 
Rotterdam and Antwerp (Belgium) and a large transit airport (see below). On the other hand, an 
important explanatory factor relates to social ties created by migration: the major immigrant 
groups in the 1960s and 1970s originated from drug-producing or exporting countries such as 
Suriname, the former Netherlands Antilles, Morocco, and Turkey (Fijnaut et al. 1998, pp. 83–
87). This created social and economic links to cocaine-exporting countries (Southern America), 
cannabis-exporting countries (Morocco), and transit countries for heroin (Turkey). This “social” 
aspect of a country’s opportunity structure for transnational illegal activities is also visible in 
migrant smuggling. Human smugglers have often been smuggled themselves and have 
relationships with destination countries as well as with countries of origin, whereas smuggled 
migrants want to migrate to countries where family and/or larger communities are present. 
Opportunities for transit crime, therefore, have both social and more physical aspects. 
The social opportunity structure relates to links between people: criminal organizations or 
criminal networks linking specific persons in different countries. Without such links and such 
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social organization, the transnational criminal activities are difficult to execute, whereas existing 
links may foster new streams of illegal goods and people. When researchers fail to take into 
account existing social ties and existing criminal networks, explanations for transnational 
criminal activities run the risk of only highlighting comparative advantages and opportunities 
that are never fully realized, because the social ties between people who would have to realize 
this potential have never been there in the first place. 
Research on “borders” and “border crossing” (instead of place and the journey to crime) 
may also focus on the licit opportunity structure. An interesting early example is the comparison 
of drug prices in several European countries by Farrell (1998), concluding that (low) drug prices 
are closely related to licit transportation flows through certain logistical nodes in Europe. 
This brings us also to the point that crossing borders and evading customs and other 
controlling agencies have physical, social, and economic aspects. Some people are allowed to 
cross borders without restrictions, whereas other people are more intensively checked when 
crossing borders. The same applies to particular economic goods being transited from one 
country to another. The modus operandi of smugglers, regardless of whether we are talking about 
people, drugs, or other goods, is closely related to the legal possibilities of crossing borders, 
including loopholes. Drugs are often smuggled alongside licit cargo (without being noticed) or in 
cargo that is difficult to check, or where checks are very labor intensive or economically 
infeasible (e.g., fresh goods that have to be moved quickly such as fruit, meat, fish, flowers, et 
cetera). Similarly, people smuggling often involves “regular channels”: entering as a legal citizen 
(using false documents), (fake) marriage, visas for students, scholars, or tourists, business 
invitations, and so on (for a review, see, e.g., Zhang 2007). 
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The parallel with routine activity theory stands out, as illicit activity feeds off licit 
activities and the opportunity structure that is created by licit activities and licit actors. Empirical 
research could take into account findings from environmental criminology and focus on 
transnational flows and the connections between particular countries. Furthermore, particular 
techniques (such as graph theory) could also be used when analyzing these new issues (similar to 
the analysis of street networks by using graph theory). In this respect, an important missing link 
is empirical research into central logistical nodes such as airports and harbors. Street segments 
and “pockets of crime” have been investigated in great detail, but important logistical nodes such 
as airports and harbors have largely been neglected by criminologists. This is problematic, as 
border crossing takes on many forms: at airports, passengers, luggage, cargo, catering, waste, 
and facilitating personnel goes into and out of “landside” and “airside” zones on a massive scale 
and on a daily basis, but empirical criminological research into these processes and 
accompanying security problems is largely nonexistent. Furthermore, government agencies such 
as customs and border police are relatively small players in a field consisting of many private 
companies and private security companies. This makes central logistical nodes such as airports 
and harbors very interesting new empirical themes for environmental criminology. 
For situational crime prevention, transit crime creates three types of problems (Kleemans, 
Soudijn, and Weenink 2010, pp. 31–32). First many transit crime problems are “hidden” 
problems: If flows of passengers, luggage, or cargo are not checked systematically, smuggling 
flows go unnoticed or may be disregarded as a minor problem. Second, there is often a difference 
between the countries that would have to take security measures and the countries suffering the 
consequences. Exporting countries and transit countries typically are well positioned to play a 
crucial role in preventing smuggling, but often have a much smaller interest in preventing these 
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activities than the receiving countries (of, e.g., smuggled passengers and illegal goods). The very 
nature of illegal cross-border activities thus creates political tensions between different countries 
with different interests. Finally, there is the difficult trade-off between security interests and 
economic interests. A free flow of goods and people serves economic interests, and balancing 
these interests with adequate border controls is a very real problem for open Western economies. 
At airports and in harbors, this difficult trade-off is aggravated by the fact that private companies 
and private security companies reign supreme in these logistical nodes, creating problems of 
collective action, coordination, or outright defection (as strict controls, except for, e.g., 
explosives, involve high costs and low benefits for some private partners). 
4. Local Markets of Illegal Goods and Services 
Local markets of illegal goods and services have been studied intensively by various scholars, as 
access to these types of markets is easier than getting access to detailed information on 
transnational criminal activities. A landmark study is Reuter’s analysis of specific local illegal 
markets such as gambling, numbers, and loansharking (Reuter 1983). In his book Disorganized 
Crime, Reuter argues that most criminal enterprises will be small and ephemeral, as offenders 
have to deal with various constraints of illegality: illegal activities have to be concealed, people 
can be arrested, and assets can be seized at any time. 
Later studies often focused on local drug markets (for recent examples see, e.g., Bernasco 
and Jacques 2015; Piza and Sytsma 2016),
2
 with a strong focus on “open air” drug markets. In 
many Western European countries, specific recent ethnic immigrant groups dominate the trade in 
open-air drug markets, whereas native offenders are more prevalent in other major sectors of the 
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 Because of space limits, I do not go into the study of street and window prostitution. For a review of research into 
e.g., the social ecology of Red-Light Districts, see Weitzer (2014), and for a review of criminogenic aspects and 
relationships with organized crime, see Kleemans and Huisman (2015). 
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drugs market, most notably those for cannabis and synthetic drugs, including production, 
importation, and exportation, and indoor drug markets (Paoli and Reuter 2008). However, the 
major focus of criminological research is on visible and accessible open-air drug markets and 
street dealing. 
Seminal work on the geographic analysis of illegal drug markets has been done by Eck 
(1995), Rengert et al. (2000), and Rengert, Ratcliffe, and Chakravorty (2005). Many studies 
reflect theoretical notions spelled out by John Eck (1995) in his general model of the geography 
of illicit retail marketplaces. The basic idea is that sellers and buyers of illicit goods and services 
have to find ways to meet each other. One strategy is to use social networks, by selling only to 
people you know or to related people being introduced through social networks. This is relatively 
safe but restricts the number of potential customers. A different, more risky strategy is to sell to 
strangers, but meeting and trading in a safe way with strangers is a complicated task. Eck (1995, 
pp. 74–76) describes three problems. First, sellers and buyers cannot rely on a network for 
communication, so they have to use routine activities and meet in places in which both already 
conduct licit routine activities. Therefore, these places 
will be located along major thoroughfares and at nodes of major activities, such 
as shopping centers, places of employment, recreation areas or schools. In short, 
illicit retail market areas where stranger-to-stranger selling takes place are likely 
to be near where people naturally concentrate. (Eck 1995, p. 75) 
Second, security is a major problem, as strangers have to identify each other as potential buyers 
and sellers and face difficulties identifying and locating each other. Third, they often need the 
help of place managers to turn a blind eye, tolerate, or facilitate their behavior. According to Eck, 
this leads to four geographical characteristics: high place attachment, the involvement of place 
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managers, distribution along arterial routes and near nodes of high licit activities, and high 
density of the illicit marketplace (as they can serve many people). 
In a recent study, Bernasco and Jacques (2015) add two important concepts from recent 
literature on retail geography: multipurpose shopping and comparison shopping. Multipurpose 
shopping means that customers’ trips often serve multiple purposes. Comparison shopping refers 
to the finding that customers often want to compare multiple retailers, which means that retailers 
often locate in the proximity of competitors. The empirical study provides evidence that dealers 
go to places where the likelihood of successfully soliciting customers is high, but no evidence is 
found that they avoid places with informal and formal social control. 
Piza and Sytsma (2016, pp. 40–42) explore the defensive actions of drug sellers in open-
air markets: the use of partners in drug transactions (co-offenders, lookouts, or stashers of drugs 
or money), particular transactional mediation schemes (to obscure the occurrence of the 
transaction), conducting different phases of the transaction at different places, the use of stash 
spots (for drugs, guns, or money), and raising or slowing down the speed at which transactions 
occur. In the empirical study, dealers mainly turn out to work alone (90% of all transactions) and 
only involve partners (mostly runners) during the evening. Many defensive actions are related to 
geographic settings (commercial versus mixed residential settings) and time of day (daytime 
versus evening), but transactions were most often observed to occur immediately and lacked any 
mobility by the participants. Virtually no transactional schemes and stashes were used: sellers 
often held the drugs in an easily accessible place on their person (particularly when operating in 
a commercial setting) and in a minority of transactions they used an off-person stash (particularly 
in mixed residential settings). 
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All in all, the empirical study, similar to other studies, largely focuses on transactions on 
the spot between a seller and a buyer. It is important to note that such lower-level drug 
distribution by drug sellers is often studied, but in many countries falls outside of the official 
definitions of organized crime (see for a review, e.g., Paoli and Vander Beken 2014). Many 
definitions require cooperation between two, three, or more offenders over a prolonged period as 
well as criminal activities with substantial social harm (often meaning transnational drug 
trafficking and medium-level distribution of drugs instead of retail distribution by individual 
sellers). That means that most of the empirical work that has been done by researchers from the 
field of environmental criminology (i.e., on the geography of drug dealing) would not qualify in 
many countries as research into organized crime. However, a lot can be learned from these 
studies regarding criminal activities (rather than criminal cooperation). 
5. Places and the Role of the (Built) Environment 
MacDonald (2015) reviews the literature on the impact of housing and the built environment on 
crime. It is striking that the reviewed studies mainly focus on predatory crime and public 
nuisance and that organized crime is largely absent, except for lower-level drug dealing. This is 
not because organized crime activities do not depend on the built environment. For cannabis 
cultivation, for example, offenders need property (attics, cellars, sheds, [rented] commercial 
properties) to grow, harvest, dry, and parcel out cannabis; sellers of cuttings; wholesale cannabis 
buyers; and service providers such as electricians or “grow room builders” (Spapens, Van de 
Bunt, and Rastovac 2007; Decorte, Potter, and Bouchard 2011). The physical and social 
environment is critical for the successful operation of these illicit activities. 
In a review of the importance of the environment for organized crime activities such as 
drug trafficking, human smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, and various forms of 
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organized fraud, Kruisbergen, Van de Bunt, and Kleemans (2012, pp. 81–228) describe 
extensively how the environment facilitates organized crime and how offenders depend on 
facilitating environments. For each type of criminal activity, logistical requirements can be 
formulated, and how the environment enables criminal collaboration and criminal activities can 
be described. 
Two things stand out compared to more traditional topics in environmental criminology. 
First, the facilitating environment comprises physical, social, economic, and even political 
factors. All these factors go beyond the individual rational actor. Social relationships with other 
persons are very important for access to co-offenders, lawyers, notaries public, financial 
advisors, employees of airports, harbors, or government agencies. Furthermore, legal entities and 
companies are important for combining legal and illegal activities or for getting access to other 
companies. Offender behavior in organized crime does not only naturally involve co-offending, 
but also combines social relationships with the opportunities created by institutional 
arrangements (legal entities and companies). Finally, whole subcultural or ethnic communities or 
economic sectors may be more or less supportive for carrying out certain illicit activities. This is 
important, as organized crime activities often involve prolonged co-operation in criminal 
activities that can be noticed by law enforcement and the immediate social environment. 
Shielding activities from formal and informal social control, therefore, is the heart of the matter. 
In environmental criminology, the wider social, economic, and sometimes political aspects of the 
physical environment are often disregarded.
3
 When studying organized crime, it is unwise to 
disregard these salient factors. 
                                                          
3
 For certain types of crime and offender behavior this is not problematic. Furthermore, studies on criminogenic 
environments and ‘gentrification’ often include these aspects. 
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Second, many organized crime activities have a “glocal” character (Hobbs 1998). Illicit 
activities are both transnational in character and locally rooted in cities, neighborhoods, and 
economic sectors. Offenders are located in neighborhoods and economic sectors, search for 
suitable co-offenders, organize their activities, and invest their illicit proceeds in specific 
locations and economic activities. It is striking that Italian Mafia groups do not invest in sectors 
with the highest economic profitability. On the contrary, control of the territory seems to explain 
their investment behavior better than economic factors (Savona 2015). Furthermore, offenders in 
Dutch organized crime cases primarily invest in their countries of origin and economic sectors 
familiar to them: proximity explains their investment behavior better than power or profit 
motives (Kruisbergen, Kleemans, and Kouwenberg 2015). Although the “glocal” character of 
organized crime is straightforward, research often focuses either on the transnational aspects of 
organized crime (disregarding the concentration of co-offenders and illegal activities in 
particular places) or on the lower end of local distribution markets of illegal goods and services. 
6. Theoretical Progress on Organized Crime and Places 
Environmental criminology has a lot to offer for the study of organized crime and places. 
However, the full potential of environmental criminology can only be realized if “place” is 
conceptualized in a different way and on a higher level than a specific point in space where an 
offender meets a target. Also for predatory crime, much progress has been made by including 
empirical research into offender behavior (e.g., the journey to crime and offender decision-
making processes), the distribution in space of potential offenders (including the influence of 
housing), and routine activities of offenders and victims (influencing the interactions of 
motivated offenders and suitable targets in space and time in the absence of capable guardians). 
For organized crime, we need to go one step further and take co-offending seriously. As 
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organized crime often requires a higher degree of social organization than opportunistic street-
level crime, I will elaborate on two theoretical concepts that should be included in the study of 
organized crime and place: social opportunity structure and offender convergence settings. 
Without including these concepts, researchers run the risk of missing the main driving 
mechanisms behind the emergence and activities of criminal networks at specific places. 
6.1 Social Opportunity Structure 
For certain types of predatory crime, such as burglary, robbery, or theft, opportunities are 
ubiquitous and open to everyone. For organized crime, and particularly transnational criminal 
activities, opportunities are only there for individuals with the right connections who are able to 
organize successful cooperation—often over a longer period of time—to seize these 
opportunities. For explaining organized crime, therefore, it is important to focus not only on the 
physical opportunity structure, but also on the social opportunity structure, a concept coined by 
Kleemans and De Poot (2008) and defined as “social ties providing access to profitable criminal 
activities” (p. 75). Social opportunity structure can not only explain the development of 
individual criminal careers but also be combined with topics such as crime script analysis and the 
connection between crime and place. The fact that people operate within criminal networks 
means that the continuity and flexibility in the execution of criminal activities are enhanced. 
Depending on their criminal network contacts, offenders have access to co-offenders and 
alternative ways to organize specific criminal activities. Morselli and Roy (2008) combine this 
idea with crime script analysis and point out that nodes in networks create permutations to crime 
scripts, which means that there are alternative ways of carrying out specific criminal activities. 
Conversely, isolated offenders will never be able to organize these criminal activities. 
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For crime and place, regardless whether we are talking about racketeering, transit crime, 
or local markets of illegal goods and services, it is important to focus also on the geographical 
structure of criminal networks and criminal ties. For racketeering, it is important that a strong, 
geographically isolated social network is already there and that legitimate government and law 
enforcement are absent, creating the opportunity for criminals to build a power structure, based 
on social contacts, economic interests, and political interests. The best situation to achieve this is 
relative isolation, in a social, economic, and political sense. In his book Mafias on the Move, 
Varese (2011) describes situations conducive to Mafia control, for example, a small, isolated 
village with a relatively isolated and monoculture economy, versus situations in which Mafia 
control fails, for example, a much larger city in which various economic actors operate on 
interregional or international markets (having no interest in “protection” as well as many 
possibilities to evade Mafia control). 
For transit crime, the social and economic links between particular countries are 
important, as criminal networks are built upon existing social relationships and criminal 
activities are facilitated by licit flows of goods and people between countries. It explains why 
most cocaine to Europe is shipped through Spain (with its historical social and economic links to 
South America) and the Netherlands (with its links to Suriname and the former Dutch Antilles as 
well as the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp [Belgium]). It also explains human smuggling 
routes, as states with social and economic bonds often ease travel and trade restrictions and 
create more opportunities for licit and illicit flows of goods and people. Important examples are 
travel options between (former) Communist countries such as China, Russia, and Eastern 
European countries, and changes in human smuggling and heroin-trafficking routes after the end 
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of the Cold War and the new membership of former Communist countries of the European 
Union. 
Finally, for local markets of illegal goods and services, social ties are also important, if 
we focus on the connections between transnational criminal activities and the local infrastructure 
or distribution through social networks. For open-air drug markets, it seems less relevant or 
perhaps only for shielding activities from law enforcement, through good contacts with other 
dealers and place managers. However, for more elaborate structures, such as local cannabis 
cultivation and distribution, it is clear that social ties are also important for getting access to co-
offenders, enablers, and different locations that are necessary for carrying out these criminal 
activities. 
6.2 Offender Convergence Settings 
For organized crime, existing social ties are very important, but not all necessary capabilities can 
be found in existing relationships, and for successful criminal activities, networks need to be 
expanded. Therefore, introductions by existing contacts to third parties are vital, and this draws 
attention to the places where offenders spend their social and professional life. Felson (2006) 
coined the term “offender convergence setting” and explained it with the example of the tough 
bar where offenders can meet potential co-offenders and which allows criminal cooperation to 
persist even when the particular persons vary. Such offender convergence settings enhance the 
durability of offender networks and create a source for new potential recruits (Felson 2006, pp. 
97–99; Kleemans and Van de Bunt 2008). 
For organized crime, we have to look beyond the tough bar and include several aspects of 
social life: meeting places in neighborhoods, nightlife, entertainment districts, and leisure 
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activities (e.g., shooting and motorcycle clubs). However, the idea of offender convergence 
settings can also be extended to professional life and work settings 
There are different ways in which occupations may present opportunities for committing 
organized crime: first, through international contacts and travel movements. Contacts with other 
countries and other social groups provide ample opportunity to discover and act on certain 
opportunities for (transit) crime. Examples are occupations involving mobility, transport, and 
logistics. Second, individual freedom of movement and/or discretion is important. This explains 
the involvement of directors of (small) businesses, independent professionals, and, in some 
cases, individuals with relative autonomy in larger organizations, such as companies and banks. 
More trust and autonomy means more opportunity for abuse as well. Third, the social nature of 
certain occupations is important. Occupations in which people often meet with different people 
also present many opportunities for encounters with potential co-offenders (Kleemans and Van 
de Bunt 2008, p. 195). 
Due to the thin line between licit and illicit activities, the concept of offender 
convergence settings should be extended from the tough bar (in which known criminals meet) to 
salient offender convergence settings in social and professional life. It is important to note that 
these settings need not only be “place based,” as they follow the logic of social relationships and 
shared activities. For transnational crime, it means that these settings often transcend borders 
(e.g., transnational licit activities and connected professional settings) or are connected to 
international logistical nodes such as airports and harbors. For more local aspects of organized 
crime, offender convergence settings may be “place based” and typically lack formal 
guardianship or even reverse the mechanisms of guardianship when criminal activities are 
protected rather than prevented. Examples described by Huisman and Jansen (2012) include 
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trailer camp communities and outlaw motorcycle gangs. In such areas and/or communities, it is 




This chapter described the connection between organized crime and places for three types of 
organized crime: racketeering, transit crime, and the local provision of illegal goods and services. 
Place turns out to have a different meaning for these three types of organized crime and raises 
several theoretical challenges. As these types of organized crime often require a higher degree of 
social organization than opportunistic street-level crime, two theoretical concepts should be 
included in the study of organized crime and place: social opportunity structure and offender 
convergence settings. Without including these concepts, researchers run the risk of missing the 
main driving mechanisms behind the emergence and activities of criminal networks at specific 
places. Furthermore, the full potential of environmental criminology can only be realized if 
“place” is conceptualized in a different way and on a higher level than a specific point in space 
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